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THE CONTINGENT FEE CONTRACT IN DOMESTIC RELATIONS CASES-Thompson v. Thompson.
INTRODUCTION

A contingent fee contract between an attorney and client is
not illegal in North Carolina.' The contract will be upheld if it is
made in good faith, "without suppression or reserve of fact or of
apprehended difficulties," and if it is totally free from undue influence.2 Another requirement is that the compensation bargained for
must be just and fair.3
Before Thompson v. Thompson,4 the question as to the validity of a contingent fee contract in a domestic relations case had
never been decided by a North Carolina court.5 The Thompson
court, faced with such a contract, followed the majority of jurisdictions in the United States and held that a contract between attorney and client for the payment of an attorney's fee which is "contingent upon the securing of a separation or divorce or contingent
in amount upon the amount of alimony, support or property settlement obtained is void as against public policy."'
This Note will sketch the background of the contingent fee in
North Carolina and then examine contingent fee agreements in domestic relations actions in other jurisdictions. The Note will then
examine the Thompson court's holding and look at some unanswered questions. The Note concludes that, based on the public
policy of North Carolina and of the majority of other jurisdictions,
the court reached the correct decision in holding that contingent
fee contracts in domestic relations actions are against public
policy.
THE CASE

The law firm of Stepp, Groce, Pinales & Cosgrove, the inter1. High Point Casket Co. v. Wheeler, 182 N.C. 459, 467, 109 S.E. 378, 382-83
(1921).

2. Id., 109 S.E. at 383.
3. Id.
4. 70 N.C. App. 147, 319 S.E.2d 315 (1984), rev'd, 313 N.C. 313, 328 S.E.2d
288 (1985).
5. Id. at 154, 319 S.E.2d at 320.
6. Id. at 149, 319 S.E.2d at 317.
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venor-plaintiff, agreed to represent 7 Mrs. Thompson, the defendant, in connection with a contemplated domestic relations action
against Mrs. Thompson's then-husband, Donald 0. Thompson.'
The law firm and Mrs. Thompson entered into a contingent fee
contract,9 the validity of which was the issue in this appeal. 10
Shortly after the contingent fee contract was entered into, Mrs.
Thompson discharged the intervenor law firm and retained another attorney to handle her domestic case." The underlying domestic action was instituted 2 by Carol Thompson against Donald
Thompson and L & 0, Inc.'" Stepp, Groce, Pinales & Cosgrove
filed a motion to intervene in this action. 4 In their motion, they
alleged that they were the discharged attorneys of Mrs. Thompson
and that they had a one-fourth contingent fee contract with her
which gave them a proprietary interest in the subject matter of the
controversy.' 5 They also alleged that they were entitled to a percentage of the recovery in the domestic action.'" In its discretion,
the district court of Henderson County allowed the intervention
"under the permissive right to intervene provisions of Rule 24 of
7
the Rules of Civil Procedure.'
The intervenor-plaintiff law firm served Mrs. Thompson with
a complaint' s which alleged, inter alia, that an offer to settle the
Thompsons' domestic case was offered to Mrs. Thompson by a letter from Mr. Thompson's attorney 9 and that based upon the contingent fee contract the firm was entitled, as the discharged legal
7. The firm agreed to represent Mrs. Thompson in early January, 1981. Id. at
147, 319 S.E.2d at 316.

8. Id.
9. The contingent fee was executed on January 27, 1981. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. "The underlying domestic action was instituted on February 27, 1981."
Id.
13. L & 0, Inc. was a family owned business. In the divorce action, Mrs.
Thompson was asking for "alimony pendente lite, and the setting aside of certain
purportedly fraudulent conveyances and stock transfers involving the family business and properties." Id.
14. The firm filed their motion on March 12, 1981. Id. at 147-48, 319 S.E.2d
at 316.
15. Id. at 148, 319 S.E.2d at 316.

16. Id.
17. Id. (citing the district court judge).
18. The complaint was filed on March 13, 1981. Id.
19. The offer was made on February 9, 1981. Id. The amount offered was
more than $1,000,000. Id. at 151, 319 S.E.2d at 318.
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counsel, to one-fourth of the value of the offer.2" The trial court
concluded that the intervenor law firm did a "considerable amount
22
of work in a complex case"'" during a period of about six weeks
which culminated the settlement offer which was "substantially accepted" by Mrs. Thompson prior to the discharge of the firm.2 3
The trial court held that the contingent fee contract was fair and
reasonable 24 and the amount of the fee under the contract was
$250,000.21 Considering the amount of time involved and the
standing of the-lawyer, the trial court concluded, using the relevant
hourly basis as a guide, that a reasonable fee would be at least
$20,000.6 The trial court concluded, as a matter of law, that the
plaintiff law firm was entitled to $85,000 as a reasonable fee, less
credit for $37,000 Mrs. Thompson paid to the attorney she hired
after she discharged the plaintiffs.27
The North Carolina Court of Appeals held that "the contract
sued upon by the intervenor law firm is unenforceable exclusively
by virtue of the fact that it violates the public policy of this
state."2 8 The court decided that the law firm should be allowed to
recover in quantum meruit so the case was reversed and remanded
for a new trial to determine the reasonable value of the services
provided by the law firm "free of the taint of the unenforceable
29
contingency fee agreement.
BACKGROUND

In 1921, the Supreme Court of North Carolina, in deciding two
separate cases,3 0 set out the initial guidelines to be used in cases
20. Id. at 148, 319 S.E.2d at 316.
21. Id. at 152, 319 S.E.2d at 318. Mr. Stepp and Mr. Thompson's attorney,
Mr. Boyd B. Massagee, believed that the Thompson case was both "complicated
and complex." It presented "questions involving the law of partnership, trusts,
fraud, alimony, child custody, support, joint bank accounts and the confidential
relationship between husband and wife." Id. at 151, 319 S.E.2d at 318.
22. January 5, 1981 to February 16, 1981. Id. at 152, 319 S.E.2d at 319.
23. Id. (quoting the trial court).
24. The court took into consideration that Mrs. Thompson "had very little
money, if any, to pay an attorney upon a fiat fee basis at the time she employed
said plaintiff law firm." Id. (quoting the trial court).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 157, 319 S.E.2d at 322.
29. Id. at 158, 319 S.E.2d at 322.
30. Stern v. Hyman, 182 N.C. 422, 109 S.E. 79 (1921), overruled, Rock v.
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involving contingent fee contracts. In Stern v. Hyman,3 1 the court
stated that it was well-settled that "if the contract sued upon by
the attorney is made during the existence of the [attorney-client]
relationship, and more especially when the contract is for a portion
of the subject-matter contended for," the attorney could only recover the reasonable value of his services, no matter what kind of
contract he had entered into with his client.3 2 The rule was based
on the confidential relationship between attorney and client and
was enforced "in order to prevent fraud and as a matter of...
public policy." 3 The Stern court went on to say that while the
attorney-client relationship exists, "the attorney cannot bind his
client" in any way that will increase his compensation for his services to more "than he would have the right to demand if no contract had been made during the existence of the relationship."3 4
Another factor pointed out by the court was that the burden was
upon the plaintiff's attorney to show that the contract was fair and
6 as authority, the court stated
reasonable.3 " Citing Lee v. Pearce"
that parties to a contract must stand on equal footing and that a
universally recognized principle3 7 was that certain fiduciary relations such as the one between an attorney and client raise a rebuttable presumption of fraud as a matter of law."
The second North Carolina Supreme Court decision in 1921
relevant to the issue was Casket Co. v. Wheeler.3 9 The Casket Co.
court stated that it was neither a violation of law nor against good
morals, but rather commendable, for an attorney, who believes a
client or possible client has been wronged, and is unable to hire an
attorney, to bring suit upon a promise of reward contingent upon
the result. 40 The contingent fee contract must be made in good
faith, without suppression or reserve of fact or apprehended difficulties, and without any kind of undue influence.4 1 The compensaBallou, 286 N.C. 99, 209 S.E.2d 476 (1974) and Casket Co. v. Wheeler, 182 N.C.
459, 109 S.E. 378 (1921). Both of these cases were filed on November 16, 1921.
31. 182 N.C. 422, 109 S.E. 79 (1921).
32. Id. at 423, 109 S.E. at 80.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 423-24, 109 S.E. at 80.
35. Id. at 424, 109 S.E. at 80.
36. 68 N.C. 76 (1873).
37. 182 N.C. at 424, 109 S.E. at 80.

38. Id.
39. 182 N.C. 459, 109 S.E. 378 (1921).
40. Id. at 467, 109 S.E. at 382-83.
41. Id., 109 S.E. at 383.
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tion bargained for must be fair and just.42 The court emphasized
good faith, and said the entire transaction should be characterized
by good faith on the part of the attorney. 43 The court stated that
the contract would not be upheld if it was shown that it was "obtained by fraud, mistake, or undue influence; or if it [was] so excessive in proportion to the services to be rendered as to be in fact
oppressive or extortionate.

'44

As far as the amount or percentage

of recovery, an attorney may demand a larger compensation if it is
not certain or if it is to be contingent.4 5 A contingent fee "is not

allowed for the rendition of merely minor services which any layman or inexperienced attorney might perform."' 6 It is only allowed
to attorneys as a reward for diligence and skill exercised in the
prosecution of doubtful and litigated claims.' 7
In Randolph v. Schuyler, 8 the North Carolina Supreme Court
stated that the rule of Stern was more strict than the prevailing
rule in other jurisdictions.' 9 The court decided that it did not need
to determine whether the rule should be modified on that appeal.50
The court went on to say that the generally accepted view was that
it did not matter when the contract was entered into but it must
be "shown to be reasonable and to have been fairly and freely
made, with full knowledge by the client of its effect and of all the
material circumstances relating to the reasonableness of the fee."'"
"Contracts for contingent fees . . . are closely scrutinized by the

courts where there is any question as to their reasonableness, irrespective" of when they were made.2 The attorney must carry the
burden of proof as to the reasonableness and fairness of the
contract.

3

Without overruling or modifying Stern, the Randolph court
seemed to lay the groundwork for its decision in Rock v. Ballou."
The Ballou court overruled the portion of Stern which stated that
42. Id.
43. Id.

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
284 N.C. 496, 201 S.E.2d 833 (1974).
Id. at 504, 201 S.E.2d at 837.
Id., 201 S.E.2d at 837-38.
Id., 201 S.E.2d at 838.
Id.

53. Id.
54. 286 N.C. 99, 209 S.E.2d 476 (1974).
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a contract between attorney and client which fixed the attorney's
compensation, made while there was an existing attorney-client relationship, was void as a matter of law and the attorney could only
recover on the basis of quantum meruit." The court stated the
correct rule to be the one set out in Randolph as prevailing in
other jurisdictions.5 The new rule was made applicable whether
the contract called for a contingent fee or a fixed fee.5 7 The Ballou
court went on to uphold the rule governing a contingent fee con58
tract set out in Casket Co.
The Ballou court set out the two main rules that govern contingent fees in North Carolina. If the contract is entered into during the existence of the attorney-client relationship, both the Randolph rule" and the Casket Co. rule 60 are applicable."1 If the
contract is entered into prior to the inception of the attorney-client
relationship, it seems that only the Casket Co. rule applies.
Although contingent fee contracts are often upheld, the majority view in the United States is that a fee contract contingent upon
securing a divorce or contingent in amount on the amount of alimony, support, or property settlement to be obtained, is against
public policy and void.62 Since the North Carolina Court of Ap55. Id. at 103-04, 209 S.E.2d at 478.
56. Id. at 104, 209 S.E.2d at 478. In quoting Randolph, the Ballou court
stated that the correct rule was that:
[a] contract made between an attorney and his client, during the existence of the relationship, concerning the fee to be charged for the attorney's services, will be upheld if, but only if, it is shown to be reasonable
and to have been fairly and freely made, with full knowledge of the client
of its effect and of all the material circumstances relating to the reasonableness of the fee. The burden of proof is on the attorney to show the
reasonableness and the fairness of the contract, not upon the client to
show the contrary.
Id. quoting 284 N.C. at 504, 201 S.E.2d at 837-38.
57. 286 N.C. at 104, 209 S.E.2d at 479.
58. Id.. The rule in Casket Co. was that:
[A] contract for a contingent fee must be made in good faith, without
suppression or reserve of fact or of apprehended difficulties, and without
undue influence of any sort or degree; and the compensation bargained
for must be absolutely just and fair, so that the transaction may be characterized throughout by all good faith to the client.
Id. quoting 182 N.C. at 467, 109 S.E. at 383.
59. See supra note 56.
60. See supra note 58.
61. 286 N.C. at 104, 209 S.E.2d at 479.
62. 7 AM. JUR. 2D Attorneys at Law § 257 (1980).
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peals considered Thompson to be a case of first impression in this
jurisdiction on this issue, 3 it is only appropriate that cases from
outside jurisdictions on this point of law be examined.
The leading case on this issue" is the Michigan case of Jordon
v. Westerman.6 The defendants in Jordon were attorneys66 whom
67
the plaintiff had retained to prosecute a divorce suit for her.
Prior to the divorce decree, the defendant in the divorce suit paid
the defendants in the present action $4,500 "in full for alimony,
costs, and expenses."6 8 The suit was brought to recover that
amount.6 9 The defendants claimed they were entitled to one-half
of the $4,500 under an agreement which they claimed to have been
made between them and the plaintiff.7 0 The contract entered into
between the plaintiff and defendants stated that the defendants
were to receive as reasonable compensation for their services and
costs whatever amount the plaintiff's husband could be compelled
to pay by the court, or otherwise, for either temporary or permanent alimony, as well as whatever the court allowed for costs and
expenses, unless the amount was over $300.71 If the amount exceeded $300, the defendants were to receive one-half of the remainder or additional sum. 72 The agreement was signed by the
73
plaintiff.
The Supreme Court of Michigan held that these types of contracts were against public policy for two reasons.74 The first reason
was based on a Michigan statute75 that provided that "[in every
suit, brought either for divorce or for separation, the court may, in
its discretion, require the husband to pay any sums necessary to
enable the wife to carry on or defend the suit during its pendency. ' '7' The court stated that this allowance of temporary ali63. 70 N.C. App. at 154, 319 S.E.2d at 320, rev'd, 313 N.C. 313, 328 S.E.2d
288.
64. Annot., 30 A.L.R. 188 (1924).

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

62 Mich. 170,
Id. at 172, 28
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 175, 28
Id.
Id. at 176, 28
Id. at 179-80,
Id.

28 N.W. 826 (1886).
N.W. at 826.

N.W. at 827.
N.W. at 828.
28 N.W. at 829-30.

HOWELL'S STATUTES

§ 6235.

76. 62 Mich. at 178, 28 N.W. at 829 (quoting § 6235).
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mony was not assignable and that it was against public policy to
permit the wife to bargain it away in advance of receiving it." The
second reason given by the court was that "[p]ublic policy is interested in maintaining the family relation. '7 8 The court stated that
contracts like the one in question tend to prevent reconciliation
which the public welfare and the good of society demand, if practicable or possible.7 9 If these contracts were legal they would bring
about the "alienation of husband and wife by offering a strong inducement, amounting to a premium, to induce and advise the dissolution of the marriage." 80 The evil that the court was trying to
prevent was illustrated in the case that was before it because every
effort of reconciliation was opposed and thwarted by the attorneys
because it was in their best interest under the contract not to allow
reconciliation.8 1 The court concluded that the contract giving the
defendants one-half of the alimony awarded by the court, or other82
wise, was null and void.
The Supreme Court of Iowa was faced with a contingent fee
contract in In re Sylvester's Estate.8 3 The' court stated that ordinarily a contingent fee contract was enforceable, 4 but that the
contract in the case involved more than the question of the payment of a contingent fee for legal services.8 5 This contract "involved an agreement to pay an attorney's fee contingent upon the
procurement of a divorce and the adjustment of property rights in
connection" with it.8 6 In general, a contract of this type is against
public policy and void.8 7 "The sanctity of the marriage relation,
the welfare of children, the good order of society, the regard for
virtue, all of which the law seeks to foster and protect, are ample
reasons why such [a] contract should be held to be contrary to
77. Id.
78. Id. at 180, 28 N.W. at 830.

79. Id.
80. Id.

81. Id. The defendants admitted to the attorney for Mr. Jordon that it would
be against their interest to have the parties reconcile and that they should not
make any effort to have them do so and also that they were trying to get as large
a sum as possible in looking out for their own interest. Id. at 176, 28 N.W. at 828.
82. Id. at 175, 28 N.W. at 830.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

195 Iowa 1329, 192 N.W. 442 (1923).
Id. at 1332-33, 192 N.W. at 443.
Id. at 1333, 192 N.W. at 443.
Id.
Id.
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public policy."8 8 Like the Supreme Court of Michigan in Jordon,
the Supreme Court of Iowa held that a contract for an attorney's
fee which is contingent upon the procurement of a divorce was
against public policy and illegal and void. 9 The court stated that
public policy encourages, and the law favors, reconciliation between the parties.9 0 The court stated that a contract of this type
involves the personal interests of the attorney in preventing reconciliation between the parties.9 1
The Supreme Court of Montana, in Keller v. Turner,9" relied
on In re Sylvester's Estate and another Montana case, Coleman v.
Sisson,93 in affirming the rule that contingent fee contracts in domestic actions are void."' The Coleman court stated that with
these types of contracts, the attorney is interested in the alienation
of husband and wife, not in their reconciliation. 8 The Keller court
also held that the rule against contingent fee contracts in domestic
relations actions was applicable regardless of whether the agreement was entered into before or after the action for divorce was
commenced.6
In Aucoin v. Williams, 97 the Court of Appeal of Louisiana,
Third Circuit, held that a contingent fee contract in a divorce action was void as against public policy.98 The court stated that the
rationale of the rule was to allow the parties to decide whether to
reconcile without the pressure of an attorney because of a contingent fee predicated upon the procurement of a divorce.9 9 The
Aucoin court relied on the case of Succession of George E. Butler.10 0 According to the Butler court, the law's attitude to the marriage relation is that "[p]ublic policy, good morals, [and] the highest interest of society require that the marriage relations should be
surrounded with every safeguard and their severance allowed only
88. Id., 192 N.W. at 444.
89. Id., 192 N.W. at 443.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. 153 Mont. 59, 453 P.2d 781 (1969).
93. 71 Mont. 435, 230 P. 582 (1924).
94. 153 Mont. at 62, 453 P.2d at 783.
95. 71 Mont. at 444, 230 P. at 585.
96. 153 Mont. at 62, 453 P.2d at 783.
97. 295 So. 2d 868 (La. App. 1974), cert. denied, 299 So. 2d 798 (La. 1974).
98. Id. at 874.
99. Id. at 873.
100. Id. at 871-73 (discussing Succession of Butler, 294 So. 2d 512 (La.
1974)).
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1985
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for the causes specified by the law, and clearl' proven."' 0 1 The
Louisiana Civil Code states that "individuals cannot by their conventions derogate from the force of laws made for the preservation
of the public order or good morals."'' 0 In keeping with this policy,
every attempt should be made to have the estranged couple
reconcile. 0 3
The Thompson court found the opinion of the Appellate
Court of Indiana in Barrelli v. Levin"" very persuasive. In reviewing the early history of the contingent fee contract, the Barrelli
court said that the early common law considered some contingent
fee contracts champertous and therefore void on the public policy
ground that such contracts tended to promote litigation and multiply lawsuits. 0 5 The Supreme Court of Indiana eventually recognized that persons who had rights but no means by which they
could pursue them had to resort to contingent fee contracts in order to procure legal redress.' 0 6 This showed that the reason for
holding contingent fee contracts champertous no longer carried
any weight in Indiana. 0 7 The Barrelli court noted that when the
courts began upholding contingent fee contracts, either because
they were technically not champertous or because the court found
they were necessary to enable persons to enforce their rights, the
courts did not extend and have not extended their blanket approval to all contingent fee contracts. 0 8 It is only when these contracts are fairly made between the attorney and client, and made
in good faith, free from fraud or imposition, that they are legal and
enforceable. 0 9 Quoting the case of Jordon v. Kittle," ° the Barrelli
court stated that contracts that are intended to promote divorce
are held void as against public policy."' Later in the Barrelliopinion, the court stated that it was not ready to say that it was no
longer the public policy of Indiana to discourage divorce and to
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
(1905)).
110.
111.

295 So. 2d at 872 (quoting Butler, 294 So. 2d at 514).
295 So. 2d at 872 (citing LA. CIVIL CODE art. 11 (West 1952)).
295 So. 2d at 872.
144 Ind. App. 576, 247 N.E.2d 847 (1969).
Id. at 582-83, 247 N.E.2d at 850.
Id. (quoting Draper v. Zebec, 219 Ind. 362, 37 N.E.2d 952 (1941)).
144 Ind. App. at 583, 247 N.E.2d at 850.
Id. at 588, 247 N.E.2d at 453.
Id. (quoting Whinery v. Brown, 36 Ind. App. 276, 281, 75 N.E. 605, 607
88 Ind. App. 275, 150 N.E. 817 (1926).
144 Ind. App. at 586, 247 N.E.2d at 851.
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condemn contracts that provide incentives to attorneys to provide
divorces for their clients and discourage reconciliation. " 2 The
court went on to say that even if it were inclined to hold that the
public policy of the state had changed and these contracts were no
longer against public policy, there was no compelling reason to do
so. This was so because the wife's ability to hire an attorney was
assured by statute which empowered and required the court to order the husband to pay a preliminary fee and a reasonable fee at
the time the wife was granted the divorce.1 13 The court believed
that everyone would benefit by maintaining the present public policy of not enforcing these types of contracts no matter how freely
and fairly they were entered into and how reasonable the fee under
them might be." 4 The trial judge can be relied upon to assure
every attorney an adequate fee and thereby assure every wife adequate representation." 5 The chance of an occasional judicial overvaluation or under-valuation is a small price to pay for the social
advantages inherent in judicial control of wives' attorneys' divorce
fees. " ' The social advantages inherent in judicial control of these
fees also outweighs the occasional frustration of a wife who is unable to hire the attorney of her choice because he does not trust the
evaluation of his services to judicial discretion." 7 The court concluded that "all fee contracts between wives and their attorneys
which measure the fee in terms of sums equal to percentages of
'whatever may be recovered'" in a divorce action are void."'
The majority rule, and the rationale for it can be summarized
as follows:
It is the policy of the law when differences arise between parties
to a marriage that no obstacle should be placed in the way of
their reconciliation. Consequently, it is not fitting that it should
be for the interest of an attorney that there should be no reconciliation. If compensation for the attorney's services is contingent on
the securing of a divorce, or if the amount to be paid for his services is proportioned to the amount of alimony to be received, the
attorney is in a position that his interest would be against reconciliation of the parties. A contract for the payment of a fee to an
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 588-89, 247 N.E.2d at 853.
Id. at 589, 247 N.E.2d at 853.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 590, 247 N.E.2d at 854.
Id.
Id.
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attorney, contingent upon his procuring a divorce for his client or
contingent in amount upon the amount of alimony to be obtained, is void as against public policy." 9
ANALYSIS

In Thompson v. Thompson, 120 the North Carolina Court of
Appeals held that "a contract for the payment of an attorney's fee
contingent upon the procurement of a separation or divorce or contingent in amount upon the amount of alimony, support or property settlement obtained is void as against public policy."' 2 ' The
court stated that it need not address each of the defendant's separate arguments 2 ' because it based its decision on the ground that
the contract was void as against public policy and therefore unenforceable. 123 The court stated that the validity of a contingent fee
contract in a domestic relations action had never before been decided by this jurisdiction, but the prevailing view in other jurisdictions was that this type of contract was against public policy and
24
void.
The court, in its analysis, seems to have overlooked the case of
119. Annot., 30 A.L.R. 188 (1924).
120. 70 N.C. App. 147, 319 S.E.2d 315 (1984), rev'd, 313 N.C. 313, 328 S.E.2d
288 (1985).
121. Id. at 149, 319 S.E.2d at 317.
122. Id. at 149, 319 S.E.2d at 319. The defendant mainly challenged the trial
court's judgment by assigning error to the court's order allowing the plaintiff law
firm to intervene in the action. The defendant argued that the order allowing
intervention was improper because:
(a) the fee contract was void as against public policy and therefore unenforceable; (b) the contract sued upon, including the claimed fee, violates
the Code of Professional Responsibility and is void; (c) no cause of action
was stated in the complaint in intervention; (d) intervention was improper under Rule 24 of the Rules of Civil Procedure; and (e) no cause of
action had arisen on the date of intervention, 2 April 1981, as the underlying action was not finally settled until 8 September 1981, when the de-

fendant wife recovered from her former husband.
Id.
123. Id., 319 S.E.2d at 319-20.
124. Id. at 154, 319 S.E.2d at 320. For this proposition the court cited 7 AM.
JUR. 2D Attorneys at Law § 257 (1980); Annot., 30 A.L.R. 188 (1924); See e.g.,
Keller v. Turner, 153 Mont. 59, 453 P.2d 781 (1969); Levine v. Levine, 206 Misc.
884, 135 N.Y.S.2d 304 (1954); McDearman v. Gordon & Gremillion, 247 Ark. 318,
445 S.W.2d 488 (1969); Osborne v. Osborne, 384 Mass. 591, 428 N.E.2d 810
(1981); Sobieski v. Maresco, 143 So. 2d 62 (Fla. App. 1962); Aucoin v. Williams,
295 So. 2d 868 (La. App.), cert denied, 299 So. 2d 798 (La. 1974). Id.
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Pierce v. Cobb 12 5 in which the Supreme Court of North Carolina
stated that "[i]f the object of a contract is to divorce man and wife,
the agreement is against public policy and void."'" 6 In Pierce, an
action was brought by Mrs. Cobb's attorneys to recover the
amount of two notes that were payable to them.2 7 The notes had
been assigned by B.P Cobb and J.H. Cobb, the defendants.128 The
notes did not become due or collectible until Mrs. Cobb procured a
divorce from her husband, B.P. Cobb." ' The reason for the rule
that a contract to divorce man and wife is void is that the law
views with repugnance all contracts which the purpose of or the
direct tendency of which is to dissolve the marriage relationship.
This repugnance is because of the law's regard for virtue, the good
order of society, the welfare of the children, and the peculiar sanctity of the marital relation. 130
Pierce appears to be on point with Thompson'3 ' and it seems
that the rule laid out by the court is applicable. The Pierce court
specifically stated that "[i]f the object of a contract is to divorces2
man and wife, the agreement is against public policy and void.''

With this statement, it seems to make no difference whether the
125. 161 N.C. 300, 77 S.E. 350 (1913).
126. Id. at 302, 77 S.E. at 351.
127. Id. at 300, 77 S.E. at 350.
128. Id. at 301, 77 S.E. at 350.
129. Id., 77 S.E. at 350. On the back of the notes at the time they were executed was the following:
It is fully understood and agreed that this note shall not become due nor
collectible in any event until Mrs. Ruth Cobb shall have obtained from
her husband, the said B.P. Cobb, in a court of competent jurisdiction, a
complete and absolute divorce from the bonds of matrimony, and shall
present the said B.P. Cobb a duly certified copy of the decree granting
same; this being the consideration for which this note is given. If the said
Ruth Cobb shall fail to secure said divorce within at least six months
from 10 June 1911, then this note shall be null and void. And the payees
herein, in accepting this note, agree to the conditions above set out.
Id.
130. Id. at 302, 77 S.E. at 351.
131. In Pierce, the agreement was between Mr. and Mrs. Cobb. The plaintiffs
in the case, Mrs. Cobb's attorneys, received the notes for her. The facts do not say
whether the notes were given to the plaintiffs to collect for Mrs. Cobb or to pay
the plaintiffs for procuring the divorce for her. If the notes were given to the
plaintiffs for compensation, they were contingent upon procuring a divorce for
Mrs. Cobb and the court was dealing with a contingent fee contract in a domestic
relations action.
132. 161 N.C. at 302, 77 S.E. at 351.
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contract is between a husband and wife or between a husband or
wife and their attorney. Indeed, it would seem that a fee contract
contingent upon the procurement of a divorce would have as its
primary objective the divorce of the husband and wife and under
the rule in Pierce, would be void as against public policy.
The Thompson court found the opinion of the Appellate
Court of Indiana in Barrelli very persuasive. The Thompson court
stated, as the Barreli court pointed out, there are two basic public
policy considerations which have led the courts to invalidate contingent fee contracts in divorce actions. The first is the recognition
that these contracts tend to promote divorce, 133 and the second is

the lack of need for such contracts under modern domestic relations law.1 - 4 The court also stated another relevant policy consideration that was identified by the Barreli court. Wives contemplating divorce are often distraught and have no experience in
negotiating contracts. 13 5 Charges of overreaching and undue influence will be all too frequent if contingent fee contracts between
wives and their attorneys become the usual fee arrangement under
such conditions.

13 6

All of the public policy considerations discussed in the Barrelli
137
opinion are reflective of the public policies of North Carolina.
Even though the specific question as to the validity of a contingent
fee contract in a domestic relations action had not been decided
before Thompson, it was firmly established that a promise or contract contingent on the future separation of a husband and wife
would not be sustained.1 38 As early as 1912, in the case of Archbell
v. Archbell,139 the Supreme Court of North Carolina said it was
established that articles or deeds of separation are permissible
where the separation immediately follows, but agreements that
look to the future separation of husband and wife will not be sus133. 70 N.C. App. at 155, 319 S.E.2d at 320.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 156, 319 S.E.2d at 321 (quoting 247 N.E.2d at 853). Note that the
use of the word "wives" as opposed to "spouses" in this Note is the wording chosen by the court, and is not intended to reflect the views of the author or of the
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW.

136. Id.
137. Id. at 157, 319 S.E.2d at 321.
138. Id. The court cited Archbell v. Archbell, 158 N.C. 409, 74 S.E. 327
(1912), and Matthews v. Matthews, 2 N.C. App. 143, 162 S.E.2d 697 (1968), as
authority.
139. 158 N.C. 409, 74 S.E. 327 (1912).
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tained. 14 0 The court in Pierce cited Archbell and held that if the
object of a contract is to divorce man and wife, the agreement is
void as against public policy. 4 The North Carolina Court of Appeals, in Matthews v. Matthews, 4 2 stated that "[o]ur society has
been built around the home, and its perpetuation is essential to
the welfare of the community."'14 3 The law does not look favorably
upon agreements that will bring about or encourage the destruction of the home. 44 Because of these reasons, these types of agreements or contracts are held to be void as against public policy and
1 5
are unenforceable in the courts of North Carolina.
The holding of the Thompson court is consistent with the
holdings in Archbell, Pierce, and Matthews and the policy behind
those decisions. The Thompson court stated that it was persuaded
by the reasoning and logic of the Barrelli court that it was in the
best interest of the citizens of North Carolina to adopt the rule
that a contract for the payment of an attorney's fee contingent
upon his procuring a divorce for his client or contingent upon the
amount of alimony and/or property awarded is void as against
public policy.' 4 Even though the court relied on Barrelli,the court
would have probably reached the same result without doing so.
The rules and policies set out in Archbell, Matthews, and especially Pierce are strong enough to support the Thompson court's
I
holding.
In holding that the contingent fee contract between Mrs.
Thompson and the law firm was unenforceable solely because it
violated the public policy of North Carolina, the court said it did
not need to address the question of whether the contingent fee
contract was necessary in order for Mrs. Thompson to seek legal
redress. 47 North Carolina General Statutes § 50-16.4 applies to
140. Id. at 414, 74 S.E. at 329. The court also stated that the agreement must
be made under circumstances of such character as to "render it reasonably necessary to the health or happiness of the one or the other." In quoting from a Montana case, the court said that "[mere willingness to live apart is not enough.
Neither will the agreement be enforced when it is the result of mutual caprice or
reckless disregard of marital obligations. Neither will such an agreement be enforced when it is to be used as a means to facilitate a divorce." Id.
141. 161 N.C. at 302, 77 S.E. at 351.
142. 2 N.C. App. 143, 162 S.E.2d 697 (1968).
143. Id. at 147, 162 S.E.2d at 699.
144. Id.
145. See generally, 3 STRONG'S N.C. INDEX 3d, Contracts § 6.2 (1976).
146. 70 N.C. App. at 157, 319 S.E.2d at 321-22.
147. Id. at 157 n.3, 319 S.E.2d at 322 n.3.
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counsel fees in actions for alimony. The statute provides:
At any time that a dependent spouse would be entitled to alimony pendente lite pursuant to G.S. 50-16.3, the court may, upon
application of such spouse, enter an order for reasonable counsel
fees for the benefit of such spouse, to be paid and secured by the
supporting spouse in the same manner as alimony. 4 8
The first requirement of § 50-16.4 is that the spouse asking for
counsel fees must be a dependent spouse. The term "dependent
spouse" is defined by § 50-16.1(3) as "a spouse, whether husband
or wife, who is actually substantially dependent upon the other
spouse for his or her maintenance and support or is substantially
in need of maintenance and support from the other spouse. 1 49 The
second requirement of § 50-16.4 is that the dependent spouse must
be entitled to alimony pendente lite. Alimony pendente lite is defined by G.S. § 50-16.1(2) as "alimony ordered to be paid pending
the final judgment of divorce in an action for divorce, whether absolute or from bed and board, or in an action for annulment, or on
the merits in an action for alimony without divorce."1 50 The
grounds for alimony pendente lite are set out in G.S. § 50-16.3.151
Even though the Thompson court did not address this issue, it
is apparent that the statutory scheme of North Carolina has been
designed to ensure a dependent spouse the financial means to employ an attorney.1 52 Indeed, it is well established that the purpose
of allowing counsel fees in North Carolina is to enable the depen148.
149.
150.
151.

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.4 (1984).
Id. at § 50-16.1(3).
Id. at § 50-16.1(2).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.3 states that:
(a) A dependent spouse who is a party to an action for absolute divorce, divorce from bed and board, annulment, or alimony without divorce, shall be entitled to an order for alimony pendente lite when:
(1) It shall appear from all the evidence presented pursuant to G.S.
50-16.8(f), that such spouse is entitled to the relief demanded by such
spouse in the action in which the application for alimony pendente lite is
made, and
(2) It shall appear that the dependent spouse has not sufficient
means whereon to subsist during the prosecution or defense of the suit
and to defray the necessary expenses thereof.
(b) The determination of the amount and the payment of alimony
pendente lite shall be in the same manner as alimony, except that the
same shall be limited to the pendency of the suit in which the application is made.
152. See 70 N.C. App. at 155-56, 319 S.E.2d at 321.
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dent spouse to meet the supporting spouse, in court, on substantially the same terms by making 53it possible for the dependent
spouse to retain adequate counsel.1
Another issue that the court did not fully address was the issue of whether intervention was proper under Rule 24 of the Rules
of Civil Procedure. In the court of appeals' majority opinion, Judge
Johnson stated that the court had some reservations as to whether
the intervention was properly allowed154 and then proceeded to
handle the matter in a footnote.1 55 Rule 24(b)(2) allows nonstatutory intervention by anyone "[w]hen an applicant's claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in common."1 5 Judge Johnson stated that under the express terms of
Rule 24(b)(2) it appeared that the trial court had abused its discretion in allowing the intervention because there was no common
question of law or fact between the action under the contingent fee
contract and the Thompson's divorce suit. 57 The court then referred to Casket Co. v. Wheeler,'5 8 where, under pre-rules practice,
intervention by a law firm was held to be proper in the client's
underlying action to prevent the client from disposing of funds. 5 9
Judge Hedrick, who agreed with the majority opinion that the
contingent fee contract was void and unenforceable, 6 ° dissented
solely on the ground that the intervention was improper.' 6 ' Judge
Hedrick stated that the majority seemed to agree with the trial
court's decision allowing the law firm to intervene. 26 However, it
does not seem that the majority necessarily agreed with the trial
court on this issue. The majority stated that "it would appear that
the trial court had abused its discretion by allowing the law firm's
motion to intervene" under the express terms of Rule 24(b)(2). 6 3
It seems as though the court jumped at the chance to address the
public policy issue in this case and have North Carolina come into
conformity with the majority of the jurisdictions of the United
153. Williams v. Williams, 299 N.C. 174, 190, 261 S.E.2d 849, 860 (1980).
154. 70 N.C. App. at 153, 319 S.E.2d at 319.

155. Id. at n.1.
156. N.C. GEN.

STAT. §

1A-I, Rule 24(b)(2).

157. 70 N.C. App. at 153 n.1, 319 S.E.2d at 319 n.1.
158. 182 N.C. 459, 109 S.E. 378 (1921).
159. Thompson, 70 N.C. App. 153, 319 S.E.2d 819.

160. Id. at 159, 319 S.E.2d at 322.
161. Id., 319 S.E.2d at 323.
162. Id.

163. Id. at 153 n.1, 319 S.E.2d at 319 n.1.
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States. If the court had vacated the judgment of the trial court on
purely procedural grounds, it would not have had the opportunity
to express its much needed opinion on this area of law.
Another of Mrs. Thompson's arguments that the court did not
address was that the contingent fee contract violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility."' Ethical Consideration 5-2 states
that:
A lawyer should not accept proffered employment if his personal
interests or desires will, or there is a reasonable probability that
they will, affect adversely the advice to be given or the services to
be rendered the prospective client. After accepting employment, a
lawyer carefully should refrain from acquiring a property right or
assuming a position that would tend to make his judgment less
protective of the interests of his client.16
Even though under this ethical consideration a contingent fee
agreement may not be proper, Disciplinary Rule 5-103(A) provides
that "[a] lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the
cause of action or subject matter of the litigation he is conducting
for a client, except that he may: . . . (2) contract with a client for a
reasonable contingent fee in a civil case."1 6 The reason for allowing contingent fee arrangements in certain cases is expressed by
Ethical Consideration 5-7. "Although a contingent fee arrangement
gives a lawyer a financial interest in the outcome of the litigation, a
reasonable contingent fee is permissible in civil cases because it
may be the only means by which a layman can obtain the services
of a lawyer of his choice. 1 67 It seems that the only reason a contingent fee is allowed is to enable a person without financial means to
retain counsel to have the opportunity to exercise his legal rights.
North Carolina has a statutory scheme which ensures that attorneys will be paid in domestic relations actions when they represent
clients who do not have the means to pay them. Because of this
statutory scheme, the contingent fee is not "the only means by
which a layman can obtain the services of a lawyer of his
choice." 168 The reason for the rule of allowing contingent fees as
set forth in EC 5-7 is not applicable in a domestic relations action
such as the one in Thompson. This reasoning leads to the conclu164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id. at 153,
N.C. CODE
N.C. CODE
N.C. CODE
Id.

319 S.E.2d at 319.
OF PROFESsIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-2 (1981).
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-103(A)(2) (1981).
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-7 (1981).
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sion that contingent fee contracts in domestic relations actions are
probably a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility in
North Carolina.
An exception to the rule of not allowing contingent fee contracts in domestic relations actions should be made to cover equitable distribution actions. The pertinent part of Ethical Consideration 2-20 states that:
[c]ontingent fee arrangements in civil cases have long been commonly accepted in the United States in proceedings to enforce
claims. The historical bases of their acceptance are that (1) they
often, and in a variety of circumstances, provide the only practical means by which one having a claim against another can economically afford, finance, and obtain the services of a competent
lawyer to prosecute his claim, and (2) a successful prosecution of
the claim produces a res out of which the fee can be paid.'
Although a pure divorce action does not produce a res out of
which a fee may be paid, an equitable distribution proceeding will
produce the res if the, action is successful.1 70 Also, the equitable
distribution proceeding can only be prosecuted after divorce has
been granted.1 71 North Carolina Code of Professional Responsibility Opinion 312 (1982) states that contingent fee arrangements
may be the only practical means for a person to obtain competent
counsel in an equitable distribution action. This is so because there
is no provision for the recovery of attorneys' fees in this type of
action. 172
Since an equitable distribution action does create a res and
because the equitable distribution action can only be prosecuted
after the divorce has been granted, a contingent fee in this situation. would not seem to violate the public policy of North Carolina.
Since North Carolina courts have not directly ruled on this point,
North Carolina Code of Professional Responsibility Opinion 312
(1982) should be read in light of the Thompson court's holding.
One final issue to be addressed is whether the law firm was
entitled to any compensation for the legal services it performed for
Mrs. Thompson. After the court held that the contingent fee contract was void as against public policy, the court addressed this
169. N.C.
170. N.C.
171. N.C.

CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

EC 2-20 (1981).

CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Op.

312 (1982).

GEN. STAT. § 50-21.
172. N.C. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OP. 312 (1982).
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issue. 73 The court held that the plaintiff law firm should be allowed t.o recover in quantum meruit.174 The court noted the case of
Baskerville v. Baskerville1 75 where the Supreme Court of Minnesota held that an attorney who is a party to a contingent fee contract in a divorce action could not recover the reasonable value of
his services. 176 The Baskerville court stated that:
[s]ince the illegality of the contingent fee contract rests on the
ground that it may govern a lawyer's action in a manner which
thwarts public policy, the taint of illegality permeates the entire
lawyer-client relationship in a divorce action so that every objection to permitting a recovery on the express agreement applies
' 77
with equal force to an attempted recovery in quantum meruit.
The Thompson court refused to adopt a rule, like the one in Baskerville, that would not allow an attorney in this situation to re178
cover in quantum meruit with the case that was before them.
The court's first reason for this decision was that because the contingent fee contract was not executed until three weeks after the
establishment of the attorney-client relationship, the "taint of illegality" did not explicitly permeate this attorney-client relationship
until it was half over.1 79 The court's second reason was fairness to
the law firm because this was a case of first impression in this jurisdiction, and because the legal status of a contingent fee contract
in a divorce action in North Carolina had not been conclusively
80
established.1
The court's decision allowing a quantum meruit recovery is
consistent with the court's holding in Covington v. Rhodes.'"' In
Covington, the court stated the older rule, which is still the rule in
some jurisdictions: where an attorney acting under a contingent fee
contract is discharged without cause, he may recover the entire
contingent fee. 182 The reason for the old rule was the application of
general contract law. When the client discharges his attorney without cause, the client breaches the contract. Therefore, the attorney
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

70 N.C. App. at 157, 319 S.E.2d at 322.
Id. at 158, 319 S.E.2d at 322.
246 Minn. 496, 75 N.W.2d 762 (1956).
Id. at 513, 75 N.W.2d at 773.
Id.
70 N.C. App. at 158, 319 S.E.2d at 322.
Id.
Id.
38 N.C. App. 61, 247 S.E.2d 305 (1978).
Id. at 64, 247 S.E.2d at 307.
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can recover the entire contract price. 183 The Covington court perceived the modern trend and the better rule to be that an attorney
who is discharged, with or without cause, can only recover the reasonable value of his services as of that date." 4 The Covington
court felt that the reason for this rule was that because of the special relationship of trust and confidence that exists between an attorney and client, the client can discharge the attorney, terminating the relationship, at any time, with or without cause. 88 Another
reason for this modern trend is that before the contracting attorney could obtain an equitable interest in the recovery of his client,
he had to prosecute the case to a favorable judgment or settlement. 18 6 Consistent with this modern trend, the Thompson court
remanded the matter for a new trial so that the reasonable value of
the services provided by the discharged law firm prior to February
16, 1981, the date of discharge, could be determined.'
THE SUPREME COURT'S DISPOSITION

On further appeal of this action, the Supreme Court of North
Carolina held that the court of appeals erred in not vacating the
order allowing intervention and dismissing the intervenors from
the suit. 8 8 The court's rationale was that since the contract was
void, the "intervenors had no interest in the property or the transaction that was the subject of Ms. Thompson's suit."'8 s
The supreme court noted, in dicta, "that it is generally held
that if there can be no recovery on an express contract because of
its repugnance to public policy, there can be no recovery in quantum meruit.""90 The court ultimately reversed the opinion of the
court of appeals that had remanded the case to the district court
for a determination of the reasonable value of the services that the
discharged attorneys had performed prior to February 16, 1981."'1
The supreme court remanded the case "for an order vacating the
order allowing intervention and for the entry of an order dismissing the action filed by the intervenors against Mrs.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Id., 247 S.E.2d at 307-08.
Id. at 65, 247 S.E.2d at 308.
Id.
Id.
70 N.C. App. at 158, 319 S.E.2d at 322.
Thompson v. Thompson, 313 N.C. 313, 328 S.E.2d 288 (1985).
Id. at 314, 328 S.E.2d at 290.
Id. at 314-15, 328 S.E.2d at 290.
Id. at 315, 328 S.E.2d at 290.

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1985

21

Campbell
Law Review,
7, Iss. 3 [1985], Art. 7
CAMPBELL
LAWVol.
REVIEW

[Vol. 7:427

Thompson."' 9 2
Even though the supreme court reversed the court of appeals,
the basic holding of the court of appeals is still valid. After stating
that the court of appeals held the contingent fee contract void and
unenforceable because it violated the public policy of North Carolina, the supreme court stated that review of that issue had not
been sought and that the validity of that issue was not before
them.'9 3 In reality, the supreme court gave strength to the basic
ruling of the court of appeals on the legality of a contingent fee in
a divorce case by stating that "the opinion of the court of appeals
'9 4
on that point is the law of this case as it now stands before us.'
Had the court of appeals erred in its determination that the contingent fee contract was void, the supreme court could not have
held the intervenors as having "no interest."
CONCLUSION

The Thompson court held "that a contract for the payment of
a fee to an attorney contingent upon the securing of a separation
or divorce or contingent in amount upon the amount of alimony,
support, or property settlement obtained is void as against public
policy."' 19 In doing so, the court brought North Carolina into conformity with the majority of jurisdictions in the United States.'
The court left some unanswered questions and based its holding solely on the grounds of public policy. 97 The primary question
left open is whether a contingent fee agreement in a domestic relations action will be a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility if the public policy of North Carolina were to change as the
attitude of the public changes towards a greater acceptance of divorce. With the current state of the Code of Professional Responsibility in North Carolina, it appears that a contingent fee in a domestic relations action would be a violation, but if the public
policy of this state were to change, the Code of Professional Responsibility may change to conform with the public policy.
The court was correct in stating that the adoption of this rule
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Id.
Id.
Id.
70
Id.
Id.

at 314, 328 S.E.2d at 290.
N.C. App. at 149, 319 S.E.2d at 317.
at 154, 319 S.E.2d at 320.
at 153, 319 S.E.2d at 319-20.
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is in the best "interest of the citizens of this state." 19 8 If the rule
were otherwise, reconciliation of the parties to a domestic relations
action would not be promoted and the current public policy of
North Carolina would be undermined.
Timothy H. Graham

198. Id. at 157, 319 S.E.2d at 321-22.
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